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ATTORNEY'S FEES IN COMMON FUND ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Lodestar,' a method of calculating attorney's fees based on time ex-
pended, is fast becoming a relic of common fund2 litigation. More and
more courts have turned to the percentage-of-recovery 3 method because
it is easy to administer and encourages attorneys to seek larger recov-
eries. Yet less than two decades ago, courts abandoned the percentage
method in favor of lodestar because the former often led to windfall fee
awards and premature settlements. Frustrated with lodestar and left
without any clear guidance from the appellate courts, the trial courts
have recently begun to experiment with different fee-setting structures
based on a percentage of the recovery amount. This experimentation has
only added to the confusion and unpredictability that already character-
izes fee-setting under the lodestar regime. In their haste to find a sim-
pler, more efficient means of calculating fees, many of these courts are
confusing mere change with reform.
Part I of this Note examines the history of fee-setting in common fund
actions, with particular emphasis on the mid-1970s to 1980s-an era in
which courts relied heavily on lodestar analysis and multipliers. Part H
analyzes the abuses and inefficiencies inherent in the lodestar method. In
the mid-1980s, a series of Supreme Court decisions created confusion re-
garding the continued validity of lodestar and multipliers in common
fund actions; as a result, courts have experimented with a variety of per-
centage-based approaches. Part III examines these percentage tech-
niques and analyzes their effectiveness in correcting both lodestar's
deficiencies and those of the percentage method itself. This Note con-
cludes by arguing that federal courts must adopt a uniform method of
setting fees in common fund actions, whether a percentage or lodestar
approach. Such uniformity would facilitate case management and pro-
mote predictability. This Note recommends that all federal courts adopt
a sliding fee scale that discounts any recovery achieved in less than
twelve months. Such a method would prevent windfall fee awards while
discouraging the premature settlements normally associated with dimin-
ishing fee schedules.4
I. BACKGROUND
Under the traditional American no-fee rule, each party to a lawsuit is
1. Lodestar is the number of hours an attorney expends multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate for that attorney's services. For further discussion of the lodestar method, see
infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
3. Under the percentage method, attorney's fees are calculated according to a fixed
percentage of the settlement award or judgment.
4. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
associated with diminishing fee schedules.
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responsible for its own attorney's fees, regardless of the outcome of the
case. This rule has engendered much criticism,' however, in part because
its failure to make whole a successful plaintiff discourages less affluent
claimants from bringing potentially meritorious suits. 6 To compensate
for the shortcomings of the traditional no-fee rule, courts have developed
a number of exceptions to the American rule.
One of the best known exceptions to the American rule is the "com-
mon fund" or "fund-in-court" doctrine. When an attorney in a class
action suit helps to create, increase or maintain a fund or benefit for all
class members, the attorney may receive fees and expenses directly from
that common fund.' Common funds arise in a variety of contexts, rang-
ing from securities class actions' to products liability cases9 to antitrust
litigation. 0 In addition, cases brought under statutes containing fee-
shifting provisions" are frequently converted into common fund cases,
provided the court releases the defendant from both damage and statu-
tory fee liability upon payment of the settlement.1 2
The common fund exception recognizes that an attorney "who recov-
ers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his
client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a
whole."13 Grounded in equity, this exception "rests on the perception
that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to
5. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985) [hereinafter Third Circuit Task Force].
6. See id Despite its failure to compensate the plaintiff adequately, the American
rule was strongly reaf.rmed by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Services v. Wil-
derness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
7. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline, 421
U.S. at 257-59; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
8. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 873-77 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Il. 1990).
9. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 229, 232 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Agent Orange II").
10. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 568 (3d Cir. 1984); In re
Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 122 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
11. Congress has granted federal courts the power to award attorney's fees absent a
common fund or benefit by including fee-shifting provisions in certain statutes. See, e.g.,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1988) (granting courts dis-
cretionary authority to award attorney's fees in securities fraud cases); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1988) (granting courts discretionary au-
thority to award attorney's fees in public accommodation and employment discrimina-
tion cases).
12. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989); In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 582-83.
13. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); see also Alyeska Pipeline
Servs. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) ("historic power of equity" permits
recovery of attorney's fees from fund); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393
(1970) (same); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939) (same); Cen-
tral R.R. & Banking v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1885) (same); Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1882) (same).
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its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense."' " Cl14
actions are normally initiated by an attorney or class representative on
behalf of a largely absent group of similarly situated individuals. 5 De-
spite the representative nature of such litigation, the named plaintiffs and
their attorneys are not allowed to bill the absent class members for attor-
ney's fees and expenses. 6 Rigid application of the American no-fee rule
in this context would unfairly enrich the class members at the expense of
their attorneys and representatives. Thus, in keeping with the traditional
equitable principle of preventing unjust enrichment, all those who benefit
share the burden of litigation expenses.' 7
Attorneys in common fund cases originally received a fixed percentage
of the total recovery amount. 8 The percentage method fell into disre-
pute in the 1970s, however, because its tendency to promote excessive fee
awards created public image problems for both judges and attorneys.',9
In 1973, the Third Circuit responded to mounting public concern over
windfall fees by adopting what came to be known as the "lodestar"
method of calculating attorney's fees." A number of other circuits
quickly followed suit.21
14. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478.
15. See Bono, Percentage Approach On the Rise, Nat'l LJ., Sept. 3, 1990, at 15, cOL 1.
16. See id
17. See Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478.
18. The percentage approach stubbornly endured for almost a century. It was first
used in the 1880s at the inception of the common fund doctrine. See Central R.R. &
Banking v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885).
19. Solovy & Kaster, Re-Examining the Lodestar, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 9, 1990, at 13, col.
2. Mounting concern over windfall fee awards prompted one court to comment that
"unless time spent and skill displayed be used as a constant check on applications for fees
there is a grave danger that the bar and bench will be brought into disrepute." Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d
Cir. 1973) ("Lindy I") (quoting Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61
(D. Mass. 1963)), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy
II").
20. See Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167-69.
21. See Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 251-53 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Grunin v. In-
ternational House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864
(1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470-73 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Grinnell
I").
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976), and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), adopted a twelve-factor scale that, like
the Third Circuit's lodestar method, requires the court to examine the time and labor
expended by the plaintiff's attorney. The Johnson-Kerr fee-setting standard also weighs
eleven other criteria: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; (2) the degree
of skill required to properly perform the legal service; (3) the preclusion of other employ-
ment by the attorney during the pendency of the action; (4) the customary fee;
(5) whether the fee is normally fixed or contingent; (6) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (7) the amount involved and the result obtained; (8) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (9) the "undesirability" or risk in ac-
cepting the case; (10) the nature and duration of the attorney-client relationship; and
(11) the size of awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718-19. This list of
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II. THE LODESTAR METHOD
The "lodestar" amount is the number of hours expended by the plain-
tiff's attorney that reasonably contributed to the fund, multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.22 The hourly rate is determined by examining
the status of plaintiff's counsel.23 The lodestar figure is then increased or
decreased by a multiplier, or fee enhancer.24 Depending on the court, the
multiplier might reflect the contingent nature of the litigation, its com-
factors was based upon the American Bar Association's guidelines for private fee arrange-
ments. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(B) (1979).
Because these additional factors are often subsumed by the court's analysis of the time
and labor expended, most courts and commentators equate the Johnson-Kerr approach
with the Lindy lodestar method. See, eg., Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir.
1983) (modifying Johnson method by first multiplying attorney's time and rate, then ad-
justing lodestar upward or downward in light of other relevant Johnson factors); Moore
v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 840 (9th Cir. 1982) (endorsing a blend of
lodestar and Kerr approaches); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys'Fees: Whatfs "Reason-
able"?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 286 & n.26 (1977) (discussing Johnson method's "par-
tially redundant factors") (footnote omitted); Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at
244-45 ("most commentators consider Johnson to be little different from Lindy because
the first criterion of the Johnson test, and indeed the one most heavily weighted, is the
time and labor required").
22. See Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167-68. This description, unfortunately, is a gross sim-
plification of lodestar. Indeed, the only common theme found in federal courts' ap-
proaches to the lodestar method of fee-setting is their almost complete inconsistency. As
one commentator has observed, "[s]ome courts have rigorously reviewed the time as-
serted by the attorneys and the manner in which it was expended; others have engaged in
wholesale markdowns with little explanation of why the time claimed was excessive."
Berger, supra note 21, at 290 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, in deriving the hourly rate
to be multiplied by the time allowed, some courts use the attorney's current billing rate,
while others prefer historical hourly rates-the attorney's rate at the time the litigation
was underway-with an adjustment for interest to compensate for the delay in payment.
The difference between the two methods can be dramatic, especially where the attorney
has advanced from associate to partnership status in the interim. See In re Telesphere
Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The Telesphere court reduced the
hourly rate of an attorney only recently promoted to partnership status from $250 to
$225, resulting in a savings to the class of $8,680. See id. at 721.
23. See Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167. In evaluating an attorney's status, the court must
take into account legal reputation, experience and whether the attorney is a partner or
associate.
The court must also account for the delay in payment. Because many plaintiff's attor-
neys litigate without any private fee arrangement, they are often forced to use their own
funds to cover the fees and expenses that accrue during the class action and risk receiving
no fee award at all where no recovery is obtained. Thus, the court normally adjusts the
hourly rate to reflect this delay in payment. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
24. Enhancement for risk or quality of attorney performance is accomplished via a
"multiplier." In employing a multiplier, the court simply selects a number-for example,
2.5-that it believes accurately reflects the risk of nonpayment or quality of services per-
formed, and multiplies that number by the lodestar.
In adjusting the fee, the court must first consider the contingent nature of success. See
Lindy 1 487 F.2d at 168. Second, the court must consider the quality of the attorney's
work in light of the novelty and complexity of the issues presented in the case and the
amount of the recovery. See id. at 168-69.
As with time expended and hourly rates, the process of selecting a multiplier, whether
for contingency or for results achieved, is entirely arbitrary. See Berger, supra note 21, at
290.
1991] A TTORNEYS FEES 847
plexity, the quality of the attorney's performance or even the size of the
total recovery.2
5
A. Problems With the Lodestar Method
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, lodestar was the fee-setting
standard of choice in common fund cases in the federal court system.
Despite its widespread use, however, attorneys and commentators com-
plained that the method was inefficient and subject to abuse.26 In recent
years, a growing number of courts have expressed their dissatisfaction
with lodestar's time-rate formula by experimenting with a variety of al-
ternative fee-setting standards based on a percentage of the recovery
amount.27
1. Lodestar Increases Courts' Administrative Burden
One source of dissatisfaction is the extent to which the lodestar
method wastes scarce judicial resources. In the ordinary common fund
case, the plaintiff's attorney secures a settlement and then petitions the
court for a fee award from that same fund. The attorney is thus trans-
formed from the clients' fiduciary to a claimant against the clients' own
fund.2  The court must then act as fiduciary for the fund's beneficiaries
and closely scrutinize the fee petition to determine whether every hour
claimed was reasonably spent for the benefit of the class. 29 Unfortu-
nately, the court receives little help in performing this cumbersome
task.3" Settling defendants and class members rarely offer a response to
the fee petition, and thus, the court alone must either second-guess or
25. See infra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 669, 724 (1986) (lodestar exacerbates problem of collusive settlements
that are beneficial to plaintiff's attorney but not class); Third Circuit Task Force, supra
note 5, at 246-49 (lodestar wastes judicial resources, discourages early settlement and
leads to inconsistent results); J. Solovy & R. Mendillo, Calculating Class Action Awards"
Is It Time to Unload the Lodestar?, Nat'l L.J., May 2, 1983, at 20, col. 2 (lodestar should
be abandoned for more expeditious percentage method).
27. See, e.g., In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 162-63
(D.NJ. 1990) (rejecting lodestar in favor of sliding scale approach); Breiterman v. Roper
Corp., No. 88 Civ. 2138 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 328
at *9-10) (rejecting straight lodestar approach in favor of percentage-of-recovery method,
compared with lodestar to ensure reasonableness of fee); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723
F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D Cal. 1989) (abandoning lodestar method in favor of percent-
age approach); see also Bono, supra note 15, at 15, col. 2 (criticism of lodestar has precipi-
tated recent shift to percentage approach); Solovy & Kaster, supra note 19, at 13, col. 2
(movement away from lodestar in common fund cases is turning into a "stampede").
28. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989).
29. See id
30. "It is at this point ... that the court is abandoned by the adversary system and
left to the plaintiff's unilateral application and the judge's own good conscience." In re
Activision, 723 F. Supp. at 1374.
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defer to the attorney's judgment regarding time expended. 3' Contempo-
raneous recordkeeping may ease the court's attempt to ferret out duplica-
tive hours, but hours already billed to other matters are practically
impossible to detect. Catch-all descriptions of tasks such as "review of
work" or "conferences with co-counsel" provide an easy opportunity for
attorneys to pad their hours.32 Without any guidelines to distinguish be-
tween fictitious hours and time actually spent on behalf of the class, how-
ever, the court often has no choice but to make arbitrary across-the-
board reductions in the fee award.33
2. Lodestar Encourages Attorneys to Bill Excessive
and Padded Hours
a. Time Spent
Another criticism of the lodestar approach is that it encourages attor-
neys to bill excessive hours.3 4 Critics insist that plaintiff's attorneys
often keep litigation alive simply to maximize the number of hours used
to calculate the lodestar.35 This emphasis on the number of hours ex-
pended has spawned a whole range of dilatory tactics, such as motion
practice and lengthy discovery, designed to frustrate an early resolution
of the case.36 Such tactics increase costs to the defendant, the plaintiff
class members and the public.37
Moreover, there are few checks on an attorney's dilatory behavior.
Because of their comparatively small share in the litigation's outcome,
few, if any, common fund beneficiaries take time to scrutinize the fee
petition and object to the requested award.38 Because the settlement size
31. See iL
32. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. Iln. 1990); In re
Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 735-36 (D. Utah 1987).
33. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F.
Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
34. See, eg., In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 162
(D.N.J. 1990) ("awarding compensation based on hours spent is likely to increase the
time devoted"); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(describing the "all too familiar path of large securities cases," including "lugubrious"
pleading contests and "massive" discovery). But see In re Superior Beverage/Glass
Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 126 (N.D. Iln. 1990) (concern that lodestar
encourages long hours is "grossly exaggerated" because "nature of deferred fees in itself
discourages excessive hours").
35. See In re Activision, 723 F. Supp. at 1375; Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5,
at 247-48. Any fee-setting approach that relies on the number of hours worked "creates
an incentive to run up hours, to do too much in relation to the stakes of the case."
Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1986).
36. See In re Activision, 723 F. Supp. at 1374.
37. "Class actions would not be possible without the use of scarce public judicial
resources, and lawyers use such resources free of charge." In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131
F.R.D. 688, 691 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 13516 at *6) ("no class member ... opposed the
fee application"); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
("One member of the class appeared at the settlement hearing and raised objections to the
[Vol. 59
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is constant no matter what the attorney's fees, defendants gain nothing
by opposing the petition. Judicial scrutiny is, therefore, the only means
of assuring a reasonable attorney's fee while protecting against unneces-
sary depletion of the absent class members' fund.
The courts have been only partially effective in stemming the tide of
lodestar hours because their ability to evaluate attorney time fairly in
hindsight is inevitably distorted.39 The nature of the courts' ex post scru-
tiny also may prompt the attorney to log longer hours than necessary in
order to justify receiving a large fee award.' "[P]laintiffs' lawyers can-
not but be affected by the prospect that their compensation will be deter-
mined by some flinty-eyed judge second-guessing their every move."'4
Thus, judicial scrutiny may in fact discourage early settlement and effi-
cient prosecution of the class action.
b. Judicial Responses to the Problem of Excessive Hours
In an attempt to minimize the large number of hours logged in com-
mon fund cases, some courts actively monitor attorney activity early on
in the litigation. Some warn counsel at the outset that charges for dupli-
cative work will not be tolerated. 42 Requiring "fairly definite informa-
tion as to the hours devoted to various general activities, '43 such as
discovery, settlement negotiations and hearings may also pinpoint
excesses.
44
Some courts focus on those areas of attorney activity that are particu-
fee petition."); Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("[n]o objections... to the proposed fee award were made"); In re First Jersey Sec., Inc.
Sec. Litig., MDL No. 681 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file,
7050 at *4-5) ("Only one class member has stated that he has a 'conditional objection' to
a 25% award of fees because he does not yet know how much money he will personally
recover."); In re New York City Shoes Sec. Litig., No. 87-4677 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie, 7346 at *8) ("No objections to the fee application have
been received by the court ....").
39. See In re Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 692-93.
40. See id. at 692. "For example, if counsel engages in only a limited amount of dis-
covery and motion practice, a judge's perception of how much compensation is due plain-
tiffs' lawyers is likely to be diminished-even if a large and early settlement is produced.
Conversely, lengthy discovery and numerous motions will always seem deserving of sig-
nificant recompense, even if the settlement is smaller and long in coming." Id
41. Id
42. The Lyphomed court "warned counsel that fees would not be awarded for dupli-
cative work." Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 296 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
43. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy I"), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976) ("Lindy II").
44. This is especially true if the court is familiar with the type of case before it and
thus can estimate the appropriate number of hours each stage of the litigation should
take. See Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 13516 at *2-3) (asserting its role as fiduciary to absent
class members, court disallows 130.9 hours of unallocated time). But see In re Superior
Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 130 (N.D. I1. 1990) (requir-
ing indicia of duplication or excessive hours before penalizing attorney for "vague"
entries).
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larly susceptible to padding,45 such as reviewing,46 conferring," legal re-
search,48 travel,49 reading50 and overstaffing.5  Other courts scrutinize
fee petitions to ensure that each task was performed by an individual
with the appropriate level of skill and experience.52 Still other courts,
recognizing that "a delay in recording time often leads to its expansion,"
require contemporaneous recordkeeping and penalize those attorneys
who fail to conform to the requirement.53
45. The court in In re Continental Illinois went as far as advising counsel of the areas
that would be subject to "particular scrutiny": time spent on legal research, review of
others' work and conferring with co-counsel. In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F.
Supp. 868, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
46. See, e.g., In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130 (review time allowed only
where counsel specifically responsible for reading certain documents because counsel
should not be compensated for satisfying their curiosity."); In re Continental 11., 750 F.
Supp. at 880 (excessive time spent reviewing others' work subject to particular judicial
scrutiny); In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 735-36 (D. Utah 1987) (review is a
"catchall category with great versatility in counsels' application" and "a signal for the
padding of hours").
47. See, e.g., In re Continental IlL, 750 F. Supp. at 881 ("Counsel who are not able to
work independently should not seek to represent the class.") (quoting In re Continental
Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1983)); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734
F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (proportion of time spent conferring signals excessive
number of attorneys involved in case, resulting in duplication of effort); In re Wicat, 671
F. Supp. at 735 (meetings and telephone calls discounted by 50% where conference not
recorded by both attorneys).
48. See, e.g., In re Continental I1., 750 F. Supp. at 882-83 (disallowing fees for re-
search on law that is already well known to practitioners in that field); In re Superior
Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130 (court has discretion to reduce fee for time spent researching
irrelevant issues).
49. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 238 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Agent Orange II") (quasi-administrative items, such as travel time, should be
compensated at lower rates); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. at 882 (court
skeptical that "every moment in transit was apparently spent working on the case"); In re
Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 130 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (limiting hours worked to eight hours on travel days).
50. See, e.g., Agent Orange 11, 818 F.2d at 237 (district court did not abuse its discre-
tion by discounting time spent reading scientific materials by 50%); In re Superior Bever-
age, 133 F.R.D. at 130 (time spent reading documents for which attorney had no specific
responsibility disallowed).
51. See, e.g., In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130 (regarding overstaffed confer-
ences and status call, court credited attorney with higher billing rate while deducting
hours of second attorney); Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980))
(" '[a]mple authority supports reduction in lodestar figure for overstaffing' "). See gener-
ally Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 248 (phenomenon of overstaffing is the
"inevitable by-product of a fee-setting scheme based on hours worked regardless of the
number of lawyers involved").
52. See In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130; Kronfeld, 129 F.R.D. at 602. A
common ploy is to take advantage of higher billing rates by assigning a partner to per-
form associate's work, an associate to perform paralegal's work and so on. See In re
Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130; Kronfeld, 129 F.R.D. at 602.
53. Dutchak v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Nos. 76-C-3803, 78-C-342, 79-C-
1725 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 3877 at *19). The court
in this case responded to one attorney's failure to abide by this requirement by reducing
his firm's lodestar hours by ten percent.
[Vol. 59
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Most courts take a more passive approach, however, and intervene
only at the end of the litigation. At this point, courts must confront a
"mountain of computerized billing records"'  equipped with little more
than a vague sense of what reasonably benefitted the class. These passive
courts are not entirely to blame for their inability to allocate fees accu-
rately. Certain problems are endemic to the lodestar method whether or
not the court actively monitors counsel or possesses sufficiently detailed
time records.5" Duplicative efforts and exaggeration of actual time spent
are difficult to prove because the bulk of an attorney's activity is con-
ducted outside the courtroom. Other than an occasional brief, the only
tangible product that lends itself to judicial evaluation is the common
fund, which may be the result of factors other than the attorney's hard
work and skill. Consequently, courts are often forced to act on intuition
in deciding that the claimed hours are too numerous given the nature of
the case.
5 6
Even when they can identify routinely troublesome activities,57 courts
may still experience difficulty in deciding precisely which increments of
time are excessive or unproductive. A number of courts employ across-
the-board percentage reductions "as a practical means of trimming fat
from a fee application."5 8 The percentage reduction method is far sim-
54. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
55. As one court correctly observed, "acceptance of the proposition that the time
spent was no more than necessary, and that it produced something useful for the client, is
often an act of faith." In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 879-80 (N.D.
IM. 1990).
56. See id at 21; In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig.,
724 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Moreover, most common fund cases do not originate as class actions, but rather are
brought as individual lawsuits that are eventually consolidated. This multiplicity of suits
necessarily causes some duplication of threshold activity. See In re Telesphere Int'l Sec.
Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 717 (N.D. IM. 1990). As a result, any lodestar accepted at face
value is inflated by an unknown amount. See id The Telesphere court acknowledged
that the true measure of a reasonable attorney's award would be the fees earned by a
single firm handling the case from its inception. Nevertheless, the court did not cleave
any of the duplicative hours from the total requested, recognizing "the familiar problem
of trying to reconstruct matters in hindsight and looking from the outside in." Id. at 717.
57. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
58. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d
Cir. 1983) (allowing percentage reductions where "voluminous" fee petitions are filed);
see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1987)
("Agent Orange 11") (district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing time spent
reading, travelling, reviewing and conducting postsettlement work by 50%); Tommazzoli
v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 98 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it is "unrealistic to expect a trial
court to evaluate and rule on every entry"); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp.
868, 881-85 (N.D. I. 1990) (percentage reductions range from 25% to 100%, with par-
ticular emphasis on conferences, generalized research and duplicative work by two or
more firms); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 297-98 (N.D. Il. 1990) (per-
centage reductions of 49%, 51% and 39%); Dutchak v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Nos. 76-C-3803, 78-C-342, 79-C-1725 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file, 3877 at *20) (reducing lodestar by 10% for failure to keep contemporaneous
records); In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 734-36 (D. Utah 1987) (trimming
individual categories of fee petitions 25% to 50%).
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pler than the item-by-item accounting of disallowed hours that some
courts still employ.59 Nevertheless, the selection of a percentage is "nec-
essarily impressionistic and, to a degree, arbitrary."'6° Although more
convenient than an individual determination, the percentage reduction
method unfairly penalizes those attorneys who do accurately record ex-
penditures of time. Moreover, a result-oriented judge could easily ma-
nipulate this method of trimming lodestar excesses to achieve a
predetermined percentage or dollar amount,6' thereby defeating one of
the principal merits of the lodestar regime-its objectivity. 2
Although certain limited categories of litigation activity are routinely
disallowed,6 a there is generally no uniform approach to calculating the
number of hours applied to the lodestar figure. Individual courts differ in
their tolerance of various practices. If the court does not clearly state its
fee-setting guidelines at the outset of litigation-and apparently few do-
the attorney is left in the dark as to the fee petition's proper form of
presentation and which activities the court is likely to disallow. Such
unpredictable treatment produces other ills such as padded hours and
voluminous fee petitions. With no means of accurately gauging the prob-
able fee award, the plaintiff's attorney may keep the case alive longer
than necessary in order to ensure sufficient payment.' 4 Similarly, with-
out some kind of directive defining reasonably expended time, the attor-
ney is apt to flood the court with information, hoping that at least some
of it will apply to the lodestar. This practice further aggravates the
court's administrative burden and is one of the reasons the lodestar
method has fallen into disfavor in recent years.
59. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 594-95 (3d Cir. 1984)
(inefficient prosecution, without more, is not enough to justify across-the-board percent-
age cuts); In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 130
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (choosing "not to assume that there was fat in every application").
60. In re Continental IlL, 750 F. Supp. at 880.
61. Cf Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 247 (lodestar variables, such as
hours allowed, are subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calculate fees in terms
of percentages or amounts recovered).
62. Lodestar is considered an objective approach because it strips the court of much
of its discretion in setting attorney's fees. Under lodestar, the court must multiply the
time spent by the hourly rate and then adjust that figure by a number of predetermined
factors. Under the percentage method, on the other hand, the court is free to fix the fee
award at whatever percentage of the recovery it deems appropriate.
63. Publicity is normally disallowed. See Purdy v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727
F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (E.D. Wis. 1989). Because all time claimed must be supported by
contemporaneous records or other reliable evidence, such as the sworn statement of the
attorney, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 438 n.13 (1983), projected hours arc
also disallowed. See Purdy, 727 F. Supp. at 1270. Finally, attorneys are not compensated
for time spent preparing the fee petition or collecting the fee. See, e.g., In re Superior
Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (disal-
lowing time spent preparing fee petition); Purdy, 727 F. Supp. at 1270 (disallowing hours
expended collecting fee). But see In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1203-04
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (45.4 hours spent recording and reporting time allowed because it helps
control waste and duplication).
64. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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3. Lodestar Produces Inconsistent Results
a. Problems in Setting the Hourly Rate
In addition to computing the hours reasonably expended, the court
must also calculate the petitioning attorney's hourly rate. Normally, the
court looks to the rate customarily charged in the community for
equivalent services by an attorney of comparable status and skills.65 Yet
even this approach produces divergent views. Despite the apparent sim-
plicity of determining the appropriate community, different courts have
used such varying locations as the attorney's base of operations," the
forum city or state,67 a "national" community6s and an average of all the
attorneys' bases of operations.69 As for the value of the individual attor-
ney's services, the court must choose between the attorney's current bill-
ing rate and the historic rate with interest to compensate for the delay in
payment.70 These rates, however, vary tremendously for the same attor-
ney within the same judicial district.7" Thus, the notion of a prevailing
market rate that provides a consistent means of measuring the value of
an attorney's services is extremely misleading.
First, a plaintiff's attorney's hourly rate is difficult to calculate because
most common fund cases are prosecuted on a contingency basis.' Many
courts simply disregard this dilemma and fix the hourly rate according to
the attorney's court-approved rates in prior cases or to the rates awarded
to co-counsel of similar status and experience. But because the court,
rather than a competitive market, usually generates the hourly rates,
these rates do not accurately reflect the actual value of an attorney's serv-
ices.73 A better method compares the fees defendant's attorneys custom-
65. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); Lightfoot v. Walker, 826
F.2d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 1987); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983);
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977)("Grinnell II"); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. See Purdy, 727 F. Supp. at 1272-73.
67. For cases adhering to "forum rate" approach, see cases cited infra note 87.
68. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 233 (2d Cir.
1987)("Agent Orange 11").
69. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
70. Other courts compensate for delay in payment through the use of a risk multi-
plier. See Purdy v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 F. Supp. 1276, 1276 (E.D. Wis.
1989).
71. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
72. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 234; Weseley v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Berger, supra note 21, at 322-
24. Under a contingent fee arrangement, the attorney is paid one lump sum at the end of
the litigation if successful. This fee is not based on an hourly rate. See Weseley, 711 F.
Supp. at 716.
73. In the context of class and derivative suits, "it is the lawyers who choose them-
selves for all practical purposes-true enough, there is a one-to-one relationship between
the lawyer and the individual class representative, but that relationship cannot equate to
a bargained-for retainer by the entire class." In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F.
Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (footnote omitted). Because the court-and not the cli-
ent-sets the final fee award, few plaintiff's attorneys negotiate private fee arrangements
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
arily charge in similar cases.74
Second, variations in rates are relatively commonplace, even within the
same judicial district.75 For example, a prominent New York-based
plaintiff's attorney was awarded hourly rates ranging from $250 to $450
in the Southern District of New York in 1990.76 In 1990 in the Northern
District of Illinois, a plaintiff's attorney received rates of $1751", $247,"'
and $25079 per hour. Another well-known plaintiff's attorney was
awarded $350 per hour in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1989,80
only to receive a more moderate hourly rate of $175 in another judicial
district one year later.8" Similarly, another attorney was awarded hourly
rates of $285 and $175 during a one-year period in the Northern District
with class members. See Weseley, 711 F. Supp. at 716. Without an independent, client-
driven market for plaintiff's attorneys, hourly rates are "at levels much higher than are
necessary to provide quality representation to the class." In re Telesphere, 753 F. Supp.
at 719. But see Lynk, The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contingent
Fees in Class-Action Litigation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 247, 250 (1990) (arguing that class ac-
tion fee awards "approximate the outcome that would be observed had the transaction
been settled in the market rather than the courtroom").
Moreover, private fee arrangements do not necessarily provide a reasonable basis upon
which to determine the hourly charge. "[P]rivate clients may by their own choosing pay
slightly higher hourly rates than a court would reasonably award counsel in a class ac-
tion, where most of the class members are not individual clients of their attorneys ......
In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 131 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
74. See In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 131; Weseley, 711 F. Supp. at 716. The
Superior Beverage court took a similar approach to calculating the reasonable number of
hours expended, "ask[ing] for and receiv[ing] statements from defense counsel revealing
the hours their firms... spent on this case." In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 130.
75. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 260.
76. Compare Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 13516 at *3 n.2) (awarding admittedly high
hourly rate of $350-$450 because of Harvey Greenfield's vast experience) with Kronfeld
v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (approving special master's
recommendation of $250/hour for 1983-85 and $300/hour for 1986-89); see also In re
Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 720 & n.8 (N.D. I11. 1990) (describing
Greenfield's requested rate of $425 as a "striking instance of excessiveness" and capping
all hourly rates at $250). Only two years earlier, the In re Wicat court rejected Mr.
Greenfield's request for $325 per hour, awarding a more reasonable $175 per hour. See
In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, "732-33 (D. Utah 1987).
77. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 889 & n.13 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(rejecting Lawrence Walner's requested $265/hour and instead capping rates at $175/
hour).
78. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (awarding
counsel the average of all hourly rates requested").
79. See In re Telesphere, 753 F. Supp. at 720-21 (capping all hourly rates for attor-
neys at $250); see also Dutchak v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Nos. 76-C-3803, 78-
C-342, 79-C-1725 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 3877 at * 19)
(awarding $250/hour, but noting court's willingness to reduce this rate "were this case of
a more recent vintage").
80. See In re New York City Shoes Sec. Litig., No. 87-4677 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 6346 at *8).
81. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 889 & n.13 (N.D. Il1. 1990)
(rejecting Richard Greenfield's request for $315/hour).
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of Illinois. 2 Widespread rate variations cast suspicion on the integrity
and objectivity of the lodestar method"3 by encouraging forum shopping
for the highest hourly rate and by allowing result-oriented judges to ma-
nipulate the rate to award a predetermined amount of money.
b. Judicial Responses to the Problem of Rate Setting
Courts have experimented with a variety of approaches to ensure an
hourly rate that fairly compensates the attorney while preventing unnec-
essary depletion of the class fund. Some courts employ a schedule of
hourly rates scaled according to levels of experience and responsibility."
This approach respects the individuality of attorneys, while promoting
uniformity and administrative efficiency by doing away with the time-
consuming task of setting the appropriate rate for each attorney. 5 Uni-
form application of the fee schedule to both local and visiting counsel,
however, tends to overcompensate or undercompensate visiting coun-
sel.86 Misallocation of legal resources might result, with attorneys over-
crowding those districts awarding the highest hourly rates while other
districts remain unable to attract outside counsel with special expertise.
82. Compare id. (awarding Michael Freed a maximum rate of S175/hour) with In re
Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (awarding "benchmark" rate
of $285/hour for partners who customarily charge S285/hour or more).
83. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 246-47.
84. See In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 734 (D. Utah 1987). The court in In
re Wicat based its rate scale on the hourly rates requested by the attorneys, the rates in
other jurisdictions for similar kinds of litigation, the standardized rates in the Third Cir-
cuit Task Force Report and the court's 30 years of experience:
Category Rate
Attorneys with 0-5 years experience .................................. $80
6-10 years experience ............................................... S95
11-15 years experience ............................................ S110
16-25 years experience ............................................ $ 150
25 years experience or more ....................................... 175
Paralegals ........................................................ $40
Id; see also Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 260 (recommending use of scaled
rates in statutory fee-shifting cases). The Task Force gives as an example the rate sched-
ule adopted by Community Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia:
Category Rate
Law Students .......................................... 530-550
Attorneys with less than 2 years experience ....................... 560-585
Attorneys with 2-5 years experience ............................. $80-S120
Attorneys with 6-10 years experience .......................... SIOO-5160
Attorneys with more than 10 years experience .................. 5125-S180
Supervising Attorneys, Project Heads, Managing Attorneys, Deputy Director,
Executive Director ........................................... $130-5200
Paralegals I and II ............................................. S30-S40
Senior and Supervisory Paralegals ............................... $40-S60
Id at 260 n.70. But see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583-84 (3d Cir.
1984) (hourly rate must be individually determined for each attorney); Waldner v. Shul-
man, No. 86-7381 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 10094 at
*8) (same).
85. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 260-61.
86. Cf In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir.
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As fiduciary for the absent class members, the court should have discre-
tion to set the hourly rate according to the availability and cost of
equivalent services in the forum community.87
A few courts have experimented with ceilings on hourly rates.s At-
torneys often request hourly rates well in excess of what would be neces-
sary to obtain competent counsel. "[T]he special skill and experience of
counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rate"89
where this store of knowledge contributes to a speedy result. Counsel
should not, however, command top rates where less talent or experience
suffices. 90 Some courts have responded by awarding different rates for
different types of work.91 Such an approach, however, is possible only
where the fee petition clearly segregates and describes the different cate-
gories of work. Most litigation activity, however, does not lend itself to
this type of analysis.92
Some courts have established maximum hourly rates for attorneys'
services. Maximum rates protect against unreasonable fee awards and
1987)("Agent Orange 11") (in large class action, national rates reduce risk of overcom-
pensating or undercompensating non-local counsel).
Nevertheless, courts often disregard the possibility of overcompensation and un-
dercompensation and fix the hourly rate according to what is reasonable in the forum,
rather than what is reasonable in the attorney's home base of operations. See, e.g., Don-
nell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (advocating "forum rate"
approach), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 670 F.2d 760,
768 (7th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983); Avalon Cinema Corp. v.
Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); Dutchak v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, Nos. 76-C-3803, 78-C-342, 79-C-1725 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file, 3877 at *23) (reducing attorney's requested rate of $300/hour to
$225/hour because "[h]is work was done in Chicago," not New York). But see In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1984) (using rate applicable in lo-
cale in which attorney practices); Purdy v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 F. Supp.
1266, 1272 n.8 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (Chicago counsel not limited to Milwaukee rates).
87. See In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The
Telesphere court capped rates for all attorneys at $250 per hour, remarking that "Chicago
is scarcely a benighted backwater with little or no experience in dealing with sophisti-
cated securities litigation." Id.; see also Polk v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983) (court may use attorney's own community rate if
"special expertise of counsel from a distant district" is needed).
88. See, e.g., In re Telesphere, 753 F. Supp. at 719 (scaling back all hourly rates
higher than $250 to that amount); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 889
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (capping attorneys' rates at $175/hour).
89. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984).
90. See In re Continental Ill., 750 F. Supp. at 885.
91. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 591-93 (3d Cir. 1984)
(reducing hourly rates from partner to associate level for activities that could have been
performed by associates); Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245, 253-54 (7th Cir.) (court may
distinguish between office and trial time in fixing hourly rate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942
(1982); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)
(different rates appropriate for legal work and non-legal work such as investigation, cleri-
cal work and compilation of facts).
92. Recognizing this dilemma, the In re Continental Illinois court refused to apply
different rates because of the "mixed" nature of the fee petition's entries. See In re Conti-
nental IlL, 750 F. Supp. at 888.
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ensure that senior attorneys are not overcompensated for menial tasks."
In addition, setting a maximum rate does not require the intense judicial
scrutiny and line-drawing that task-based rates require. Ceilings, how-
ever, reduce the spread of hourly rates between senior partners and their
more junior colleagues.94 Instead of a single ceiling, some courts fix sep-
arate benchmark rates for partners and associates, thereby recognizing
the higher market value accorded an attorney with partnership status. 95
But even these categories are too general and undercompensate associ-
ates with extensive experience and overcompensate those only recently
promoted to partnership status.
c. Compensation for Delay in Payment
Selection of a reasonable hourly rate is further complicated by the need
to compensate the plaintiff's attorney for the delay in payment inherent
in contingent cases. 96 Because straight hourly rates do not compensate
the attorney for the time value of money, the court must adjust the
hourly rate or apply a risk multiplier to the lodestar figure. 97 Courts that
adjust the hourly rate often differ as to whether current rates or historical
rates with interest more accurately compensate for delay. Most courts
favor the current rate approach, probably because it is simpler and more
convenient than determining the attorney's rate for each year the litiga-
tion was in progress.9" This approach simply applies today's hourly rates
to all the time expended by counsel over the course of the litigation.
Historical hourly rates combined with an adjustment for interest are
more burdensome but provide a more precise means of compensating for
delay in payment.99 Current rates tend to be higher than historical rates
93. See id at 885-89.
94. See id at 889.
95. See, eg., Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396,
405 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (setting hourly rate for partner and lead counsel at $160 and for
associates at $85); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294, 301 (N.D. I11. 1990)
(setting average rate at $247/hour for partners and $190/hour for associates); In re
Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (awarding benchmark rates of
$285/hour for partners charging $285/hour or more; $220/hour for partners charging
less than $285/hour, and $150/hour for associates).
96. A contingent contract "refer[s] to [a] fee arrangement with [an] attorney who
agrees to accept his fee on the contingency of a successful outcome." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 320 (6th ed. 1990).
97. For a discussion of multipliers, see infra notes 103-32 and accompanying text.
98. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 255 n.5 (7th Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 110 S.Ct. 53 (1989); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1980); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 885 (N.D. 111. 1990); Purdy v.
Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 n.5 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Dutchak v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Nos. 76-C-3803, 78-C-342, 79-C-1725 (N.D. 111. April
6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 3877 at "20-21); In re Union Carbide Corp.
Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re
Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
99. See, eg., Waldner v. Shulman, No. 86-7381 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file, 10094 at *10) (lodestar calculation based on historic billing
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with interest and therefore overcompensate the attorney for the delay in
collection."°° Current rates also inadequately protect against windfalls
when the attorney advances from associate to partner at some point dur-
ing the litigation. 0 1 The historical rate approach, on the other hand,
tracks the attorney throughout each phase of the litigation and compen-
sates a given level of responsibility and experience at each point in time.
A few courts have adopted a dual approach, employing both current
and historical rates."° Although somewhat less burdensome than a
straight historical approach, this hybrid method still tends to overcom-
pensate the attorney for delay in payment.
d. Inconsistent Use of Multipliers
Like hourly rates, multipliers are notoriously inconsistent, ranging
anywhere from zero to four.' °3 The Seventh Circuit in Skelton v. General
Motors Corp. 1o has suggested limiting multipliers to 2, a 200% increase
in the lodestar figure. The majority of courts impose no limits, however,
and only recently have become sensitized to the problem of dispropor-
tionate fees.' 05 In most instances, the court is free to manipulate the
rate); Carbone v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 85-361 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file, 8805 at *19) (same); see also In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F.
Supp. 716, 718 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (historical rate with interest is more precise means
of compensating delay, but court bound to follow circuit decision advocating current rate
approach).
100. See In re Telesphere, 753 F. Supp. at 718. In that case, the partners' hourly rates
increased from $350 to $450 (28% increase), $225 to $310 (38%), $275 to $345 (25%),
$250 to $345 (38%) and $215 to $285 (33%) over the two and one-half years duration of
the litigation. See id. The difference between the recovery at current rates ($107,458.50)
and the recovery at historical rates ($92,397) amounted to more than 16 percent - a
difference which an adjustment for interest would not entirely erase. See id.
101. In In re Telesphere, for example, the court reduced a recently promoted attorney's
rate to $225 per hour, resulting in savings to the class of $8,680. See id. at 721.
102. See, eg., Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, at 13516 at *3) (time spent prior to July 1987
billed at July 1987 rate and time spent after July 1987 billed at present rate); Kronfeld v.
Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying historical rates for
the period 1983 through 1985 and 1988 current rates for work done after 1985).
103. See, e.g., In re Telesphere, 753 F. Supp. at 722 (109%); In re Superior Beverage/
Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (awarding multi-
pliers ranging from 1.5 to 2.5, depending on each attorney's contribution); In re Conti-
nental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 896 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (no multiplier allowed);
Purdy v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 F. Supp. 1266, 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (award-
ing multiplier of 2, in accordance with Skelton ceiling); In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F.
Supp. 1201, 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (1.75 for lead counsel; 1.25 for non-lead counsel); In re
Cenco Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 322, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (multipliers of 2 and 4
awarded).
104. 860 F.2d 250, 258 (7th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989). "It may be
that a doubling of the lodestar would provide a sensible ceiling. It would certainly ad-
dress the concern that extremely risky cases (those bordering on the frivolous) not war-
rant extremely large risk multipliers." Id. Contra In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at
132 (awarding maximum multiplier of 2.5).
105. See Schmitt, Shareholders Suits Pay Attorneys Less, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at
B1, col. 4.
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lodestar on the basis of a plethora of arbitrary factors. 06
Moreover, a series of Supreme Court cases severely restricting the use
of multipliers in statutory fee-shifting cases has created confusion regard-
ing the multiplier's applicability in the common fund context."'7 In
Blum v. Stenson, 08 the Supreme Court rejected novelty and complexity
of the issues presented as appropriate enhancement factors on the pre-
sumption that these factors are already reflected in the number of hours
expended by counsel." 9 The Blum Court also rejected adjustments for
"quality of representation" and "results obtained," noting that these fac-
tors are subsumed by the reasonable hourly rate used to compute the
lodestar.11" Upward adjustments for attorney performance are justified
"only in the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to
show that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reason-
ably should expect in light of the hourly rates charged and that the suc-
cess was 'exceptional.' "
In another fee-shifting case, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air,"2 the Supreme Court affirmed the Blum ruling on
quality multipliers, finding it unnecessary to enhance the fee for superior
performance because the lodestar itself includes all the relevant factors
comprising a reasonable attorney's fee. Delaware Valley 11, 13 a plurality
opinion involving a fee-shifting statute, extended the Court's restrictions
to risk-of-loss, or contingency, multipliers.11 4
The Supreme Court failed to address whether the restrictions on multi-
pliers set forth in Blum and its progeny also apply to common fund
106. See Berger, supra note 21, at 290.
107. Courts and commentators have recognized the need to distinguish between com-
mon fund and statutory fee-shifting cases. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16;
Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 5, at 250-51. For a definition of statutory
fee-shifting litigation and a discussion of the policy differences between it and common
fund cases, see infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
108. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
109. See id at 898-99. Nevertheless, a good argument can be made in favor of re-
warding the plaintiff's attorney for devoting extra time on a complicated issue. Mere
reimbursement for the number of hours expended on the litigation may not be a sufficient
incentive for attorneys to take on cases involving novel or complex legal questions.
110. Id at 899.
111. Id
112. 478 U.S. 546 (1986) ("Delaware Valley I").
113. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711
(1987).
114. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell and Scalia would reserve
risk-of-loss multipliers for exceptional cases where the need for such enhancement is sup-
ported by specific evidence in the record. See id at 728. These four justices determined
that contingency is not an appropriate criterion for enhancement because it tends to com-
pensate attorneys not only for their successful efforts in the case at hand, but also for their
unsuccessful efforts in related cases. See id
In her concurrence in the judgment, Justice O'Connor determined that an enhance-
ment for contingency might be valid if "based on the difference in market treatment of
contingent fee cases as a class, rather than on an assessment of the 'riskiness' of any
particular case." Id at 731 (emphasis in original). In order to receive such an award,
however, the petitioner would be required to show that "without an adjustment for risk
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cases. The lower courts' attempts to answer this question have been in-
consistent and their myriad responses have compounded the inconsisten-
cies and imprecision that plague the lodestar regime.
Some courts seemingly disregard the Supreme Court's directives,
awarding both quality and risk multipliers with little explanation why
the attorney merited such enhancements.115 Some courts follow the re-
strictions in certain instances but not in others." 6 Others create their
own standards for applying multipliers. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Bebchick v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, I"
for example, examined the percentage of the recovery comprised by the
fee;" the levels of contingency counsel had to overcome; 119 the public
interest nature of the suit;120 and finally, the quality of representation. 121
The courts in In re Terra-drill Partnerships Securities Litigation 122 and
Purdy v. Security Savings & Loan Association 123 examined all the Johnson
factors124 except time and rate to be applied. 125 The In re Wicat Securi-
ties Litigation 126 court examined five factors-the magnitude and com-
plexity of the litigation; 27  the quality of the representation; 28
contingency; 129 public policy;130 and the reaction by the class.' Finally,
the prevailing party 'would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel'" in the
relevant market. Id. at 733.
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens concluded that the risk of loss is an
appropriate enhancement factor. Unlike Justice O'Connor, they would base enhance-
ment for contingencies on both the market as a whole and on the particular risks of the
case.
115. See, eg., In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D. 111. 1990)
(awarding multiplier of 1.09, despite failure to indicate whether it was for quality or risk
and why counsel merited enhancement); In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Con-
sol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 131 (N.D. Ill. 1990)(court noted that "care must be taken
to avoid double compensation" for novelty and complexity, but otherwise did not justify
level of multiplier in light of Supreme Court restrictions).
116. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 234 n.2, 235 (2d
Cir. 1987) ("Agent Orange H") (noting that, although the Supreme Court restrictions
apply to quality multipliers, "equitable fund cases may afford courts more leeway" in
awarding quality multipliers in a "close case"); Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129
F.R.D. 598, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (although the strictures of Blum and Delaware Val-
ley I must be considered, "courts in this circuit retain some discretion to award multipli-
ers in equitable fund cases").
117. 805 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
118. See id. at 406-07.
119. See id. at 407.
120. See id. at 408.
121. See id. at 407-08.
122. In re Terra-drill Partnerships Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
123. 727 F. Supp. 1266, 1274 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
124. See supra note 21.
125. See In re Terra-drill, 733 F. Supp. at 1131; Purdy, 727 F. Supp. at 1274.
126. In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987).
127. See id. at 739.
128. See id. at 739-40.
129. See id. at 740-41.
130. See id. at 741.
131. See id. at 741.
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the Agent Orange court approved application of a quality multiplier,
"find[ing] that the use of a [single] national hourly rate skews the normal
lodestar analysis enough to require consideration of quality factors." 132
4. Lodestar Creates Agency Problems Between the Attorney and
Class Members
Lodestar's emphasis on time spent rather than the amount of the set-
tlement fails to harmonize the interests of the class members and those of
their agent, the plaintiff's attorney. Because the attorney's recovery is
not tied to the size of the class fund, the lodestar method provides no
incentive for attorneys to seek a larger settlement. In the typical class
action, the individual class member has only a nominal stake in the litiga-
tion's outcome and gains little by monitoring the attorney's conduct. As
a result, the plaintiff's attorney enjoys free rein to define the litigation's
objectives and it is the attorney's anticipated recovery, not that of the
class, that determines the commencement of the suit and its duration. 33
The attorney, however, has little incentive to press for a larger fund be-
cause the number of hours expended is likely to be the same regardless of
the size of the recovery.1
34
III. CONFUSING CHANGE WITH REFORM?: THE RETURN OF THE
PERCENTAGE-OF-RECOVERY APPROACH
A. The Blum Decision as Impetus for Change
Despite some early signs of dissatisfaction, 35 most courts continued to
use lodestar until the Supreme Court's decision in Blum v. Stenson '36
sparked reconsideration of this approach in 1984. In Blum, the plaintiffs
ified a request for an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.137 The district court awarded the
plaintiff's attorney the lodestar plus a fifty percent bonus 3 8 to compen-
sate for the case's complexity and novelty and for the benefit afforded the
class. In a brief footnote, the Supreme Court observed that "[u]nlike the
calculation of attorney's fees under the 'common fund doctrine,' where a
reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class, a
reasonable fee under § 1988 reflects the amount of attorney time reason-
132. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1987)
("Agent Orange II").
133. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 685-90.
134. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245, 262-63 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
135. See, eg., Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[t]o
give [hours spent] prime importance may at times result in rewarding inefficiency); Aren-
son v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("value of a law-
yer's services is not merely measurable by time").
136. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
provides that the court may grant the prevailing party "a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
138. A 50% bonus is the equivalent of a 0.5 multiplier.
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ably expended on the litigation."' 13 9 This statement has been given vary-
ing interpretations."4
A growing number of courts contend that the Blum footnote clearly
endorses the percentage-of-recovery method in common fund cases. 4
Viewing the Supreme Court dictum as legal authority for abandoning
lodestar entirely, these courts have begun experimenting with alternative
fee-setting standards based on a percentage of the fund. Others reject the
notion that Blum was a considered dismissal of lodestar. These courts
view Blum as modifying traditional lodestar analysis to include consider-
ation of the size of the fee award in relation to the size of the common
fund. 1
4 2
139. Blum, 465 U.S. at 900 n.16 (emphasis added). The Blum footnote distinguishes
between the appropriate method of calculating attorney's fees in common fund litigation
and that properly employed in statutory fee-shifting cases. A number of statutory causes
of action, such as those created by federal securities, antitrust and civil rights laws, in-
clude provisions that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.
These cases are normally characterized as "fee-shifting" cases because they shift the bur-
den of paying the attorney's fees from the plaintiff (who ordinarily would bear his own
costs under the American rule) to the losing defendant. In contrast, common fund cases
are based upon the equitable purpose of avoiding the unjust enrichment of those who
benefit from the fund that is created. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 250.
The legislative history of fee-shifting statutes, however, "makes it clear that the intent of
Congress was to encourage private enforcement of the statutory substantive rights,
whether they be economic or noneconomic, through the judicial process." Id. The
number of individuals benefited and the size of the recovery, therefore, are of little import
in calculating the statutory fee award. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 900 n.16. It is the enforce-
ment of the right that is to be promoted.
140. For a discussion of the various readings of the Blum footnote, see In re Wicat Sec.
Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 730-31 (D. Utah 1987).
141. See, eg., Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990) (Supreme Court
endorsed percentage-of-recovery method in Blum); Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Cit-
rus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasonable fee under common fund
doctrine calculated as a percentage of recovery as per Blum); Paul, Johnson, Alston &
Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Brown v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); In re
Smithkline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 532-33 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (same);
In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 162 (D.N.J. 1990)
(same); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 546 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); In re
Savings Inv. Serv. Corp. Loan Commitment Litig., No. Civ. 87-560 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 22,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 7728 at *7-8) (same); Breiterman v. Roper
Corp., No. 88 Civ. 2138 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 328
at *8-9) (same); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(same); In re TSO Fin. Litig., Nos. 87-7903, 87-7961, 87-8142, 87-8302 (E.D. Pa. July 17,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 8253 at *12) (same).
142. See, e.g., Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396,
406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (percentage of recovery is an "important factor" in deciding that
the lodestar figure is not the maximum award); In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753 F.
Supp. 716, 721-22 (N.D. Il. 1990) (percentage approach is included in lodestar); In re
Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 132-33 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (percentage of recovery is final factor in determining lodestar calculation);
Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Brown v.
Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file, 13516 at *6-7) (same); In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Busi-
ness Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Waldner v. Shulman,
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In Blum's wake, courts have split into three separate camps, each em-
ploying a different approach to fee-setting in common fund cases. Ad-
herents of lodestar have long had to wrestle with inconsistency and
imprecision in determining time, hourly rates and multipliers. Experi-
mentation with variations on the percentage-of-recovery approach and
with the hybrid lodestar-percentage method has added to this chaos.
Apart from the Ninth Circuit, which is currently leading the percentage-
of-recovery movement, the federal appeals courts have remained rela-
tively silent regarding the current state of fee-setting law in common
fund cases. Left unguided, the district courts have adopted a wide range
of approaches, often within the same judicial district. This continued
uncertainty and diversity of approach will increase the courts' adminis-
trative burden-exactly the opposite of what lodestar's critics had hoped
to achieve.
B. Percentage-of-Recovery Method
After Blum, many courts that had become frustrated with the vagaries
of the lodestar method abandoned it entirely and instead adopted the
percentage-of-recovery approach to common fund fee awards. Propo-
nents of the percentage-of-recovery method regard it as a panacea for the
delays and abuses inherent in lodestar. It is worth noting, however, that
lodestar was itself an alternative fee-setting method, designed to respond
to the abuses precipitated by the percentage method. If the percentage
method is again applied as a fixed portion of the fund, the problems that
led to its first demise, such as windfall awards, appear likely to recur.
Advocates of percentage fee arrangements seem to be confusing change
with reform.
Courts differ in their willingness to acknowledge the inherent deficien-
cies of the percentage approach. Some courts are so anxious to be free of
burdensome lodestar calculations that they appear to have given little
thought to the potential problems posed by the alternative. These courts
often award the same percentage no matter what the size of recovery or
the complexity of the case. Other tribunals are painfully aware of the
problems that led to the percentage method's first demise143 and, as a
result, have constructed intricate sliding scales," 4 auctioned litigation
No. 86-7381 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 10094 at 09-13)
(same); In re New York City Shoes Sec. Litig., No. 87-4677 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 6346 at *10) (same); Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kel-
logg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp.
726, 731 (D. Utah 1987) (lodestar is starting point for determining attorney's fees); In re
Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same),
aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
143. As Professor Coffee recently observed, "'There is tremendous fear on behalf of
judges that they will be seen as giving unjustified windfalls to plaintiff attorneys.'"
Schmitt, supra note 106, at BI, col. 4.
144. See In re First Fidelity, 750 F. Supp. at 163.
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rights, 45 and even reduced fee awards.' Yet many of these more intri-
cate techniques fail to correct lodestar's inefficiencies or to avoid the pit-
falls inherent in the traditional percentage approach.
1. The Fixed Percentage-of-Recovery Award
Frustration with lodestar has prompted a "stampede""14 back to set-
ting attorney's fees according to a fixed percentage of the class' common
fund.148 The main feature of this method - and its appeal for many
overworked judges-is its simplicity and ease of administration. Unlike
the lodestar method, which requires courts to wrestle with such "surreal-
istic" 149 concepts as reasonable number of hours expended, reasonable
hourly rates or multipliers that reflect a variety of circumstances, the
percentage approach simply requires judges to determine what portion of
the fund reasonably compensates the attorney's work.150 The number of
hours spent on the litigation is irrelevant to this calculation. Rather, the
size of the fund measures the attorney's success because "the fund would
not exist except for the attorneys' unpaid work." 51
a. Rationales for the Percentage Method In Common Fund Cases
The notion that attorney's fees should be proportional to the size of the
fund reveals important policy differences between common fund and
statutory fee-shifting cases--differences that seem to support use of the
percentage approach in the common fund context.1 52 First, the common
145. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
146. See Schmitt, supra note 106, at BI, col. 4.
147. Solovy & Kaster, supra note 19, at 13, col. 2.
148. See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311
(9th Cir. 1990) (25%); Paul Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th
Cir. 1989) (25%); Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 455 (10th Cir.)
(16.5%), cert denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); Lubliner v. Maxtor Corp., No. C-89-1807
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 3930 at *9-10) (30%);
Breiterman v. Roper Corp., No. 88 Civ. 2138 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file, 328 at *9) (less than 14%); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp.
1373, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (32.8% including expenses); In re TSO Fin. Litig., Nos. 87-
7903, 87-7961, 87-8142, 87-8302 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
fie, 8253 at *20) (23%); Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 702
(M.D. Ala. 1988) (19.5%); Howes v. Atkins, 668 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (E.D. Ky. 1987)
(40%); In re GNC Shareholder Litig., 668 F. Supp. 450, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (25%).
149. Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 258.
150. Moreover, at least one court has argued that the lodestar method cannot with-
stand a cost-benefit analysis. See In re Activision, 723 F. Supp. at 1375. Because the
result of lodestar calculations is almost always an award of around 30%, the court's
lengthy analysis of the attorney's fee petition is an inefficient use of judicial resources and
may even reduce the size of the class' fund through delay or the cost of using a special
master. See id. But see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing lack of
consistency in percentage fee awards).
151. Solovy & Kaster, supra note 19, at 13, col 2.
152. Taking their cue from Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984), a growing
number of courts have recognized the need to distinguish between common fund and
statutory fee-shifting cases for the purposes of fee-setting. See, e.g., Skelton v. General
Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting policy differences in common
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fund doctrine is rooted in the equitable principle that those who benefit
from a fund should share its costs.153 This cost sharing is possible be-
cause such a large number of people benefit and their monetary recovery
is relatively substantial. Statutory fee-shifting cases, on the other hand,
do not usually generate large class funds from which attorney's fees
could be subtracted. Intended to promote private enforcement of sub-
stantive rights," statutory causes of action often produce only nominal
damages or declarative judgments-the kind of results that do not have
monetary equivalents.155 Use of a percentage fee arrangement in such
cases would not sufficiently promote the availability of legal services be-
cause the small recovery barely covers reasonable compensation for the
attorney, let alone for individual class members. 156 In the common fund
context, however, a fee award reflecting the number of hours worked is
not necessary to induce attorney participation because the ordinary com-
mon fund case gives rise to a recovery large enough to accommodate a
percentage-based award.
Moreover, differences in who must bear the burden of compensating
the plaintiff's attorney mandate that different policies govern common
fund and statutory fee-shifting cases. In statutory fee cases, attorney's
fund and statutory fee cases, but nonetheless applying lodestar formula to common fund
case), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 53 (1989); Brown v. Phillips Petroleum, 838 F.2d 451, 454
(10th Cir.) (language of Blum "implicitly recognize[s] basic differences in the rationale
for calculating attorneys' fees in common fund cases"), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988);
Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396, 406-07 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (that the case is based upon common fund doctrine is "an all important factor in
deciding that the lodestar is not the maximum award"); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig.,
751 F.2d 562, 583 n.19 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the "public policy considerations in
the two situations are not obviously identical"); In re Smithkline Beckman Corp. Sec.
Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 532-33 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying different fee-setting methods to
common fund and statutory fee-shiftng cases best achieves their differing policy objec-
tives); In re TSO Fin. Litig., No. 87-7903, 87-7961, 87-8142. 87-8302 (E.D. Pa. July 17,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 8253 at *11-14) (discussing "need to treat fund
in court and statutory fee cases in variant ways to best achieve their policy objectives';
In re New York City Shoes Sec. Litig., No. 87-4677 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file, 6346 at *34) ("a different rule should govern attorneys fees
awards under the common fund doctrine" than in statutory fee-shifting cases); Mashburn
v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 689 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (interpreting Blum
footnote as recognition of differences between common fund and statutory fee-setting).
153. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,478 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Ser's.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 393 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939); Cen-
tral RIR. & Banking v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527, 532 (1882).
154. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546, 560 (1986) ("Delaware Valley I"); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983);
Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 250.
155. See In re Smithkline Beckman, 751 F. Supp. at 532.
156. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 586 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
Lodestar is the most appropriate means of calculating attorney's fees in statutory fee
cases because it allows "counsel [to] spend as much time and [to] be as diligent in litigat-
ing a case that benefits a small class of people, or, indeed, in protecting the... rights of a
single individual." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
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fees are assessed against the unsuccessful defendant. Because the extent
of the defendant's liability is tied to the size of the plaintiff's attorney's
fees, the defendant actively participates in the determination of the fee
award.1 57
Conversely, in common fund cases, the defendant is released from lia-
bility for attorney's fees upon payment of the settlement fund. 58 Left to
grapple with the fee petitions alone, the courts' attempts to determine
whether the lodestar hours were reasonable and beneficial to the class are
invariably frustrating and inadequate. 15 9 The percentage approach in-
troduces proportionality and predictability into the common fund fee-
setting process and does away with many of the time-consuming admin-
istrative tasks that presently burden the courts. In effect, the percentage
approach conserves scarce judicial resources currently devoted to scruti-
nizing the fee petition because it relies on "incentives rather than costly
monitoring. ' ' "6
Finally, because the attorney's fee is paid by the plaintiff class mem-
bers and not the defendant, the court does not "face the prospect that the
fee award that accounts for the difficulties and risks faced by the plain-
tiffs and their attorneys will perversely penalize defendants who have the
strongest and most reasonable defenses."' 61
b. Advantages of the Fixed Percentage Method
In Common Fund Cases
These policy rationales for the percentage approach in common fund
cases illustrate the benefits that accrue from using such a method. In
aligning the interests of the attorney and the absent class members, the
percentage approach creates a powerful incentive for the attorney to
press for a larger recovery. At the same time, percentage fee arrange-
ments do not penalize the attorney for an early settlement and may even
reward an efficient resolution. Conversely, lodestar compensates the at-
torney according to the amount of time expended on the action, not ac-
cording to the size of the recovery. Under this time-based formula, the
attorney earns the same fee whether he settles the case or achieves a
much larger recovery at trial.'62
157. "Arguably, all the judge need do is rule on the fee application based on the com-
peting presentations of the adversaries." Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 25 1.
158. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989).
159. "Such efforts produce much judicial papershuffling, in many cases with no real
assurance that an accurate or fair result has been achieved." In re Union Carbide Con-
sumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
160. Coffee, supra, note 26, at 724; see also Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 324-25
(7th Cir. 1986) (by aligning the interests of class members with their attorney, the per-
centage approach monitors the attorney's performance more effectively than the court
itself could do); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same).
161. Solovy & Kaster, supra note 19, at 13, col. 2.
162. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245, 262-63 (N.D. 111. 1979);
Coffee, supra note 26, at 717. According to Professor Coffee, even if victory at trial
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By making the attorney's fee award a function of the recovery, the
fixed percentage approach resolves the principal-agent conflicts inherent
in time-based formulae. 63 The attorney is more likely to press for a
large recovery. Early settlement also becomes a viable option because
the attorney's award is determined by the amount of the fund and not by
the number of hours spent clogging the court's docket with needless busy
work.164
Advocates of the fixed percentage (either the benchmark variety' 65 or
a percentage individually negotiated at the outset of each case) also insist
that it gives class action fee-setting a much needed aura of consistency'6
- something sorely lacking in lodestar calculations. 67 Predictability ex-
erts a positive influence on the fee-setting process by enabling both the
class members and their attorney to rationally decide the propriety of
pursuing an action based on a prediction of their expected recoveries.
Thus, individual plaintiffs would be less likely to opt out of the class
action in favor of bringing a separate suit. Moreover, the attorney would
be less inclined to drag out the litigation in order to ensure an optimal
fee. Both of these results would lighten the administrative burden on the
courts.
c. Problems With Fixed Percentage Method
Notwithstanding the handful of courts advocating a benchmark ap-
proach, "the wide range of choices that courts have made, even in similar
cases, strongly suggests the essentially arbitrary nature of 'percentage
picking.' "168 In recent years, percentage fee awards have spanned from
nineteen to thirty-three percent, with no apparent relationship to the to-
yielded a fund five times greater than the proposed settlement, the attorney "would have
had to accept a significant risk that his substantial investment of time would go uncom-
pensated [if the plaintiffs' suit was unsuccessful]. In effect, under the lodestar formula, a
plaintiff's attorney shares his clients' downside risk, but not their upside gain, by re-jecting a settlement and proceeding to trial." Id. at 717-18. Thus, lodestar acts as a
disincentive to vigorous prosecution even where the plaintiffs' case is unusually strong.
163. For a discussion of the agency problems exacerbated by the lodestar method, see
supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
164. Taken to its logical extreme, however, the percentage approach is likely to en-
courage premature settlements, especially where marginally decreasing fee scales are em-
ployed. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
165. A benchmark is a single percentage figure used over and over again, regardless of
the type of litigation or the size of the recovery.
166. See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311
(9th Cir. 1990) (approving application of a 25% "standard award"); Paul, Johnson, Al-
ston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 273 (9th Cir. 1989) (mandating award of 25%
benchmark absent "reasonable explanation of why the benchmark is unreasonable under
the circumstances"); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal.
1989) ("absent extraordinary circumstances," rate should be set at 30% to provide pre-
dictability); see also Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 258 (negotiated fee proce-
dure "offers attorneys a degree of predictability that many believe currently is lacking").
167. See Berger, supra note 21, at 283-92; Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at
258.
168. Berger, supra note 21, at 317.
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tal settlement or damages awarded. 6 9 Many courts justify their choice
of percentage by asserting that it falls within a "normal range" of fee
awards. 170 The difference in fees made by a ten percent range or "even a
single percentage of large recovery, however, can have a substantial im-
pact upon the fee recovery." '171
In addition, there is nothing inherently reasonable about one percent-
age as opposed to another. A percentage is a relative concept and one
court's award of twenty-five percent of a $19.3 million recovery does not
mean that the percentage continues to be reasonable when applied to a
$4.7 million recovery. Thus, the notion that a percentage falling within a
certain range is reasonable is inherently misleading. As one court ob-
served, "[flifty percent is neither a lot nor a little, until one knows what
the underlying whole is. Half of one cookie isn't much. Half of a full
cookie jar may well be a lot."' 72 Thus, while a fixed percentage might
add to the consistency and predictability of common fund fee-setting,
because it has no logical connection to the underlying recovery, it will
tend to overcompensate or undercompensate the attorney in relation to
the time and effort expended.' 73
169. See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311
(9th Cir. 1990) (25% of $850,000 in damages); Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,
886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989) (25% of a $4,736,000 recovery); Brown v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 453, 455 (10th Cir.) (16.5% of lessee producers'
$75,000,000 share of common fund), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); In re Smithkline
Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (25% of $22,769,000);
Lubliner v. Maxtor Corp., No. C-89-1807 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file, 3930 at *9-10) (30% of 208,450 shares of Maxtor common stock, ex-
cluding costs); In re Savings Inv. Serv. Corp. Loan Commitment Litig., No. 87-560
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 7728 at *15) (awarding
20% of $10,230,000); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (32.8% of $4,756,470, 22% of which is attorney's fees); Mashburn v. National
Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 696 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (19.5% of $17,425,000); Pav-
lidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, 675 F. Supp. 707, 709 (D. Mass. 1987)
(26% of recovery in excess of $6,500,000).
170. The conventional wisdom currently considers a range of 20% to 30% to be rea-
sonable. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, 886 F.2d at 272; In re Smithkline Beckman,
751 F. Supp. at 534; Breiterman v. Roper Corp., No. 88 Civ. 2138 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12,
1990)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 328 at *9); In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer
Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mashburn v. Na-
tional Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692 (M.D. Ala. 1988). But cf. In re TSO Fin.
Litig., Nos. 87-7903, 87-7961, 87-8142, 87-8302 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file, 8253 at *21) (fee awarded in similar cases in federal system range from
19% to 45%); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Traditionally, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have awarded fees
in the 20%-50% range in class actions."), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); Berger, supra
note 21, at 288 n.34 (survey of private antitrust cases revealed fee awards ranging from
5% to 67% of the treble damages or settlement).
171. Berger, supra note 21, at 317.
172. In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 125
(N.D. Ill. 1990); accord In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 868, 878 (N.D. Ill.
1990) ("There is nothing about 22 percent that strikes me as more reasonable than an
amount properly computed on a time basis with appropriate adjustments.").
173. See In re Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 124.
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Without an inquiry into the hours expended by the attorney and a
reasonable rate, excessive fee awards are inevitable.'74 Proponents of
percentage fee arrangements argue that because the only accurate mea-
sure of the attorney's value to the class is the size of the fund itself,
awarding the attorney a percentage of that fund is never disproportion-
ate. The percentage approach, however, tends to promote large recov-
eries with minimum effort. The favorable result is often due more to the
number of class members or the defendant's past acts than to the attor-
ney's actual skill.'75 This method may also result in disproportionate
fees where the plaintiff's attorney "piggybacks" the class action on a gov-
ernment indictment or civil enforcement action. 76 In such instances, the
plaintiff's attorney need only duplicate the government attorneys' efforts
in order to secure a settlement.'"
Windfall fee awards seem particularly inappropriate in the context of a
class action. Unlike personal injury cases, where victims routinely make
contingent fee arrangements to secure representation, class members
have little influence over their attorney and must depend on the court to
act as fiduciary in ensuring an equitable result. 78 As claimant against
the fund, the attorney's financial interests directly conflict with those of
the class because the attorney is likely to press for the largest fee award
the court is willing to give. Without an adversarial proceeding, a hybrid
time-percentage approach appears more reliable than the fixed percent-
age-of-recovery method in setting a fee award that is fair to the class.'17
2. Hybrid Approaches
Some courts have recognized that the percentage approach is less apt
to generate windfall fees when applied in conjunction with other factors,
namely the number of hours worked. In In re TSO Financial Litiga-
tion, 110 for example, the court based the fee award on a percentage of the
fund, but also considered the efficient resolution of the case, the attor-
ney's skill, the complexity of the issues and the total number of hours
devoted to the case. 8 ' In Lubliner v. Maxtor Corp.,' another percent-
age-of-recovery case, the court similarly examined the reasonableness of
174. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Grin-
nell II"); Lindy Bros. Builders, v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy I"), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 102
(3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy II").
175. See Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099.
176. See generally Coffee, supra note 26, at 682 & n.37 (suggesting tendency of securi-
ties class and derivative actions to follow SEC or bankruptcy proceedings).
177. Cf id at 682 n.37 (prior "governmental proceedings reduce the private enforcer's
search costs").
178. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1978); supra notes 28-
31 and accompanying text.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 191-98.
180. Nos. 87-7903, 87-7961, 87-8142, 87-8302 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file, 8253).
181. See id at *1719.
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the number of hours billed, the rates charged, the extent of the staffing,
the contingent nature of the case and the fact that no member of the class
objected to the proposed fee award.'83 In Brown v. Phillips Petroleum
Co.,184 the appellate court approved of the district court's hybrid ap-
proach. The lower court considered no less than eleven factors, includ-
ing time, the number of adverse parties, the number of "hotly contested"
issues and the amount of legal research required. 85 The In re Savings
Investment 186 court considered the twelve Johnson factors 87 in setting
its percentage fee award. Because it grounds the fee in something more
meaningful than the size of the recovery, 8 8 consideration of these factors
seems to guarantee a more fair and reasonable fee award. The problem
with this approach, however, is that like the Johnson-Kerr formula, no
objective standards aid in its application. 1 9 The courts mentioned here
considered a plethora of disparate factors. Even courts using similar ana-
lytic frameworks are given "no guidance on the relative importance of
each factor, whether they are to be applied differently in different con-
texts, or, indeed how they are to be applied at all."' 19 Courts are able to
exercise an inordinate amount of discretion, emphasizing certain factors
to the virtual exclusion of others. Such an approach, therefore, simply
perpetuates the current confusion and unpredictability in common fund
fee-setting.
Another approach that is rapidly gaining popularity is the combined
lodestar-percentage method. 191 This hybrid method first appeared after
182. No. C-89-1807 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file,
3930).
183. See id. at *10.
184. 838 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1988).
185. See id. at 455.
186. In re Savings Inv. Serv. Corp. Loan Commitment Litig., No. Civ. 87-560 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 7728).
187. See supra note 21.
188. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text, suggesting the size of the fund is
not always a result of the attorney's hard work and skill.
189. See Berger, supra note 21, at 286.
190. Id. at 286-87.
191. See, eg., Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396,
407 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("That this is a 'common fund' case ... is an important factor in
deciding that the lodestar figure is not the maximum award."); Puerto Rico v. Heckler,
745 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16
(1984)) (Although lodestar is the normal starting point, "[o]ther indicia of overall reason-
ableness control, 'under the "common fund doctrine," where a reasonable fee is based on
a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class.' "); In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753
F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (rejecting requested fee of 25% where it exceeded
lodestar, adding that "[t]here is certainly nothing sacred about a 25% figure"); In re
Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 128 (N.D. Iil.
1990) (ruling that "no final fee determination can reasonably be made without consider-
ing the size of the settlement"); Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ. 4654, 4665, 8001
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 13516 at *6) (after calculat-
ing lodestar, "[a]n additional method in which to assess the reasonableness of attorney's
fees is by determining the percent of the settlement fund that such fees would comprise");
Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Although Sec-
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Blum, which stated that "under the 'common fund' doctrine... a rea-
sonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the
class." '192 Many courts interpreted this footnote not as a clear endorse-
ment of the percentage approach, but rather as permission to use per-
centages to gauge the reasonableness of the lodestar calculation. 193 Thus,
under this hybrid approach, the lodestar is the starting point and focus of
the fee determination.' 94 Having arrived at the lodestar figure and ap-
plied a multiplier to reflect quality or risk, the court then calculates the
portion of the class' recovery that the proposed fee comprises. If the fee
falls within an acceptable range for that type of action, 195 the proposed
fee is awarded as is. 96 The court may exercise its discretion, however,
and adjust the lodestar to achieve the percentage the court deems most
reasonable.1 97 This approach minimizes the likelihood that the attorney
ond Circuit jurisprudence makes clear that analysis begins with lodestar, "[p]ercentage-
based calculations may... be used to demonstrate that the fee awarded is reasonable,
given the size of the jury verdict or settlement fund."); In re Union Carbide Corp. Con-
sumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (advocating
use of percentage approach in conjunction with lodestar or Kerr factors); Weseley v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("courts often assess the
reasonableness of counsel's fees by comparing them with the total recovery"); Waldner v.
Shulman, No. 86-7381 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 10094
at *13 n.3) (refusing to award full lodestar because that would have exceeded agreed-
upon limit of 25% of total recovery); In re New York City Shoes Sec. Litig., No. 874677
(E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 6346 at * 10) (noting favorably
that requested fee of 33% is less than lodestar); Zachaujasz v. Lomas & Nettleton Co.,
No. 874303 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 4213 at '8) (ode-
star equalling 28% of fund is "reasonable, fully justified, and well within the range of fees
typically awarded in this type of litigation"); Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 208, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that lodestar comprises
15.7% of fund, an amount "well within the customary range in cases of this nature"); In
re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 731 (D. Utah 1987) ("cases which analyze footnote
16 of Blum nevertheless have considered both the percentage of recovery calculation and
a lodestar calculation in ascertaining reasonable fees"); In re Warner Communications
Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the Supreme Court has.., stated
that the fee request must be looked at in terms of the percentage it represents of the total
recovery"), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
192. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
193. See In re Wicat, 671 F. Supp. at 731.
194. See id
195. Current fee law seems to favor a range of 20% to 30% of the fund, regardless of
the type of action or the size of the recovery. See supra note 170.
196. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(lodestar and multiplier total 3 1. 1% of settlement fund, "well within the acceptable range
of 20%-50%"); In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F.
Supp. 160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (lodestar and multiplier comprise 27% of recovery, in
keeping with typical range of 15%-30% in the Southern District of New York); In re
Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (requested
fee (lodestar plus 2.26 multiplier) equalling less than 25% of fund "is quite reasonable in
relation to the fees typically awarded in complex class actions"), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1986).
197. See, e.g., Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396,
409 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (increasing lodestar to 25%); Brown v. Steinberg, Nos. 84 Civ.
4654, 4665, 8001 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 13516 at
*5) (reducing requested multiplier of 1.14 to 1.13 to hold award to 30% of settlement).
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could effectively deplete the class' fund simply by logging excessive
hours. Similarly, it curbs the windfall fee awards that fixed percentages
tend to generate. 198
Despite these benefits, this hybrid approach has several troublesome
disadvantages. It does little to alleviate the administrative strain placed
on the courts by the lodestar regime. The court still must struggle to
decipher the fee petition, a process that "no matter how conscientious,
often seem[s] to take on the character of so much Mumbo Jumbo."' 199
Furthermore, the hybrid approach does not offer any of the incentives for
an early and efficient resolution of the litigation that other percentage-
based formulae provide. Because the court continues to make an ex post
fee determination, attorneys are just as likely to engage in dilatory behav-
ior as they were under a traditional lodestar approach.20° Therefore, this
approach gives attorneys little confidence in the ultimate fee, except that
it is likely to fall somewhere between twenty and thirty percent of the
total recovery.
3. Sliding Scales
Another approach that has appeared with increasing frequency in re-
cent years is the sliding scale. In its most basic form, a sliding scale is a
fee schedule in which the percentage award marginally decreases as the
size of the fund increases. 20 1 Some courts have employed formal fee
scales to arrive at a reasonable percentage award.2 °2 Other courts, while
agreeing with the policies behind sliding scales, have adopted a more flex-
198. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 268 (1983). Professor Coffee has
suggested that comparison of an appropriate percentage with that level of lodestar-calcu-
lated compensation would curb the problem of windfall fees. See id.
199. In re Union Carbide, 724 F. Supp. at 170.
200. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990). "The idea
that a retrospective award of attorney fees-in judicial parlance, 'weighing the issues in
light of a fully developed record'-protects the class against overreaching lawyers as-
sumes that lawyers who prosecute class actions are unaffected by the uncertainty sur-
rounding their compensation which stems from an expost determination." Id. at 692 n.8.
Uncertainty regarding the fee award, Judge Walker concludes, prompts the attorney to
drag out the litigation at the expense of the absent class members and the court. See Id. at
692.
201. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 256.
202. See, e.g., In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 163(D.N.J. 1990) (30% of the first $10,000,000; 20% of the next $10 million; and 10% of
any monies over $20 million); In re Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 541 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (see fee
scale which follows). The Oracle court's selection is a basic fee scale with a discount for
early settlement. It includes a $325,000 cap on litigation expenses.
Recovery Time for Resolution (months)
0-12 13 or more
Up to $1M 24% 30%
S1M-$5M 20% 25%
S5M-$15M 16% 20%
S15M or more 12% 15%
Id.
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ible stance that simply awards a smaller percentage fee where the fund is
large.2"3 Both approaches respond to a major defect in the straight per-
centage approach-windfall fee awards. Increasing the amount of the
recovery does not require correspondingly increased levels of attorney
effort." 4 Often, the increase in recovery is due to the scope of the de-
fendant's past acts or to the number of people in the class.20 5 Thus,
"[e]quity and good conscience" require that the attorney not be rewarded
for circumstance or economies of scale.2" 6
Courts must take care, however, not to construct percentage fee scales
that decline too sharply, or they might curb attorney incentive as well as
windfall fees.207 Thus, the reduction in the percentage awarded must not
correspond too closely to the changing level of recovery.208 Rather, the
attorney must continue to earn higher fees for higher recoveries,
although at a diminished rate of increase in comparison with the recov-
ery. "This differential preserves the incentives for lawyers inherent in
percentage fees while at the same time addressing the enduring criticism
that they lead to attorney windfalls."
Any fee-setting standard that diminishes the attorney's award as the
amount of the recovery increases is bound to exacerbate the problem of
premature, or "sell-out," settlements.210 In general, litigation costs
203. See, e.g., In re Smithkline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (recognizing that "the percentage of recovery fee should decrease as the size of
the common fund increases," court awards 25% because "in situations involving funds
comparable in magnitude..., courts have awarded percentage of recovery fees compris-
ing 20 to 27% of the fund"); In re Savings Inv. Serv. Corp. Loan Commitment Litig., No.
Civ. 87-560 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 7728 at "15)
("We find that a percentage award of 20% is in keeping with the sliding scale ap-
proach."); see also In re TSO Fin. Litig., Nos. 87-7903, 87-7961, 87-8142, 87-8302 (E.D.
Pa. July 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, 8253 at *16-17) (advocating sliding
scale approach, but noting that "because the total recovery to the class is ascertainable at
this point, there is no need to employ a sliding scale in determining the proper percentage
of recovery award of atto[r]ney's fees").
204. "Obviously, it is not ten times as difficult to prepare, and try or settle a ten million
dollar case as it is to try a one million dollar case, although the [fixed] percentage contin-
gent fee will return ten times as much." In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods.
Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
205. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
206. Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
207. Cf In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (differential
in decline of percentages preserves attorney incentive but promotes windfall fees).
208. See id
209. See id at 543. But see Lynk, supra note 73, at 259 & n.23 ("in the private market,
a plaintiff with a bigger case will be able to attract lawyers with a smaller contingent
percentage than will one with an otherwise identical small claim"). This theory suggests
that the court may not need to use a fee award-recovery differential in order to preserve
incentives for the attorney.
210. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 725. Sell-out settlements occur when the attorney
settles the client's claim for less than it is worth to the client. " 'Suppose a defendant
offers $100,000, the contingent fee [or percentage of the common fund promised by the
court] is 30 percent regardless of when the litigation ends, and the lawyer is sure he can
get ajudgment for $120,000 if the case is tried but knows that it will cost him, in time and
other expenses, $8,000 to try it. [The class] will be better off if the case is tried, for after
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mount in proportion to the amount of time expended by the attorney.21
As the class action progresses from one stage to the next, the attorneys
compensated under percentage fee arrangements are likely to achieve
steadily diminishing returns. The sliding scale approach aggravates this
situation because not only do the attorneys' costs increase over time, but
their fee awards will decrease upon securing larger recoveries. Thus, the
sliding scale may promote the most expeditious, but not necessarily the
best, results. Because it encourages attorneys to seek the highest return
possible on the time expended, attorneys are more likely to settle prema-
turely to the detriment of the class.212
The In re American Continental/Lincoln Savings and Loan Securities
Litigation 213 court dealt with the problem of premature settlements in a
similar, albeit more explicit, manner. The court in that case designed an
inverse sliding scale that awarded fees of twenty-five percent for the first
$150 million and twenty-nine percent for any excess amount, plus a small
bonus for early resolution of the case.214 Although the increasing per-
centage approach appears likely to end the problem of premature settle-
ments, it might do so for the wrong reasons. An increasing fee scale
rewards additional recovery but not necessarily additional attorney ef-
fort.2 15 As previously discussed, the amount of recovery can be influ-
enced by a plethora of factors having nothing to do with the attorney's
own hard work and skill. 216 The increasing percentage approach creates
an incentive for the attorney to drag out the litigation in the hope of
increasing the defendant's costs and thereby raising the settlement value
of the case.217 Moreover, this approach robs class members of the sav-
ings generated by the economies of effort that characterize larger
218recoveries.
The winning bid in the In re Oracle litigation, for instance, constructed
an alternative means of controlling the sell-out settlements implicit in
sliding fee scales. The winning bid ("the Lowey bid"), featured a sliding
scale with a discount of twenty-five percent for resolution in one year or
paying the lawyer's fee [class members will still collect] $84,000-rather than $70,000 if it
is settled. But the lawyer will be worse off, since his additional fee, $6,000 ($36,000
minus $30,000) will be less than the trial costs of $8,000 ....... In re Superior Beverage/
Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 124 (N.D. 111. 1990) (quoting Chesny
v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1983)).
211. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 688-89.
212. Savvy defendants can exploit the plaintiff's attorney's tendency to settle early by
"compelling their adversar[y] to incur litigation expenditures beyond the level at which
the plaintiff's attorney can expect to profit." Id. at 690. Tactics include excessive motion
practice and lengthy discovery. See id.
213. MDL No. 834, fee order (D. Ariz. July 24, 1990).
214. See id.
215. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 544 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
216. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
217. Cf In re Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 544 ("One can easily imagine a scenario in which
the increasing percentage fee arrangement actually discourages, not encourages, addi-
tional attorney effort and aggravates the agency problem.").
218. See id.
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less.2 19 The Lowey bid included a $325,000 cap on litigation expenses.
This discount for early settlements effectively counterbalances the pro-
pensity of attorneys operating under sliding fee arrangements to settle
prematurely to the detriment of the class. Further, because it reduces the
award by twenty-five percent of the fee available after thirteen months or
more, the discount does not unfairly penalize an efficient resolution of the
case.
220
In contrast to the early settlement discount, the cap on litigation ex-
penses may actually prompt attorneys to settle regardless of the merits of
the case. Attorneys who reach the litigation expense limit are given little
incentive not to settle for whatever the defendant is willing to offer."'
Some defendants might take advantage of this dilemma by engaging in
conduct designed to lengthen the litigation while running up the plain-
tiff's attorney's costs.' Thus, limits on attorney expenses should be
avoided. The court, in an ex post proceeding, may exercise its discretion
to refuse to reimburse part of these expenses if it does not believe they
were necessary or beneficial to the class.
CONCLUSION
No matter what elaborate formulae courts manage to construct, fee-
setting in common fund litigation will always retain its surrealistic qual-
ity. Although the task may be difficult and at times frustrating, there is
no reason that a determination of attorney's fees totalling, for example,
three million dollars or more should be any less deserving of the court's
attention than a suit for three million dollars in damages. Both affect the
plaintiff directly.
The court should announce at the outset of the litigation which fee-
setting standard it will use to determine the attorney's award. By making
its fee-setting standard known before the commencement of the case, the
court enables both the class members and their attorney to predict their
likely recoveries, thereby facilitating rational decisions regarding whether
to pursue the litigation and for how long. Consistent, predictable treat-
ment leads to more efficient litigation, which in turn reduces the court's
administrative burden.3
The court should give attorneys for the class the opportunity to negoti-
ate their choice of fee-setting standard, subject to its final approval. By
giving the attorney a voice in the selection of the fee regime, the court
219. See supra note 202.
220. Efficient prosecution of class litigation is to be encouraged, not penalized as under
the traditional time-based formulae. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618
F. Supp. 735, 748-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d cir. 1986).
221. See Schmitt, supra note 105, at B1, col. 6.
222. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 690; Schmitt, supra note 105, at BI, col. 6.
223. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 5, at 258. "By establishing the fee
agreement early in the litigation, any and all inducement or inclination to increase the
number of... hours will be reduced, since the amount of work performed will not be
permitted to alter the contingent fee." Id
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ensures that, whatever technique is applied, the attorney will have suffi-
cient incentive to earn the largest recovery possible for the class. Auc-
tioning the right to litigate224 might also be an effective means of
selecting the fee-setting method, provided that the court does not base its
decision solely on price. "Stressing price alone could... loosen the grip
that 'the same old gang' of plaintiff attorneys has over these cases."'225 If
quality of representation is sacrificed to considerations of price, however,
the interests of the class might suffer.
Courts would do well to use a fee-setting approach similar to that em-
ployed by the In re Oracle court: a sliding scale with a discount for cases
resolved in twelve months or less. Use of a percentage-based approach
will promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the fruitless, time-consum-
ing calculations of the lodestar regime. By decreasing the attorney's fees
as the size of the recovery increases, the court will put to rest the prob-
lem of windfall fee awards. Moreover, in applying a modest discount
(twenty-five percent or less) to an early resolution of the case, such an
approach counteracts the sliding scale's tendency to promote sell-out set-
tlements. Like "old wine in a new bottle," '226 this approach has the pre-
dictability and efficiency of the traditional fixed percentage method while
correcting the deficiencies that led to its initial demise.
Monique Lapointe
224. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
225. Schmitt, supra note 105, at BI, col. 6.
226. In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp.
160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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